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Abstract  
This paper seeks to unravel the political economy of large-scale land acquisitions in 
post-Soviet Russia. Russia falls neither in the normal category of ‘investor’ countries, 
nor in the category of ‘target’ countries. Russia has large ‘land reserves’, since in the 
1990s much fertile land was abandoned. We analyse how particular Russia is with 
regards to the common argument in favour of land acquisitions, namely that land is 
available, unused or even unpopulated. With rapid economic growth, capital of 
Russian oligarchs in search of new frontiers, and the 2002 land code allowing land 
sales, land began to attract investment. Land grabbing expands at a rapid pace and in 
some cases, it results in dispossession and little or no compensation. This paper 
describes different land acquisitions strategies and argues that the share-based land 
rights distribution during the 1990s did not provide security of land tenure to rural 
dwellers. Emerging rural social movements try to form countervailing powers but 
with limited success. Rich land owners easily escape the implementation of new laws 
on controlling underutilized land, while there is a danger that they enable eviction 
with legal measures of rural dwellers. In this sense Russia appears to be a ‘normal’ 
case in the land grab debate. 
Keywords: land grabbing; Russia; agroholdings; dispossession; land reserves; land 
reform 
 
1. Introduction 
The topic of large-scale land acquisition or ‘land grabbing’ has recently received growing 
attention among academics and policy makers (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009, World 
Bank 2010a, HLPE 2011). Specifically, land grabbing has been studied in Africa (Cotula et 
al. 2009, Hall 2012), South-East Asia (Julia and White 2012), Latin America (Zoomers 2010, 
Borras et al. 2012) and China (Ding 2007, Hofman and Ho 2012). However, until now, the 
vast land masses of the former Soviet Union constitute a blank spot in the global investigation 
of land grabbing, as noted by Visser and Spoor (2011a) in a first overview of land grabbing in 
this region. The current paper builds on this with a more elaborate investigation of land 
relations and mechanisms of land acquisition, focusing on the case of Russia. Furthermore 
this paper is based on recent fieldwork, whereas Visser and Spoor (2011a) was predominantly 
based on media and web research. The current literature on land grabbing predominantly tries 
to map the magnitude and speed of land grabbing, the main types of countries or private 
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actors involved worldwide, and the general drivers of the global land grab. Following new 
research lines advocated by Borras et al. (2011, p.211) this paper pursues a closer look at the 
actors involved, their motivations and interests, and especially the mechanisms through which 
large-scale land deals are enacted. The link with the global land grab debate will be made in 
particular through analyzing the ‘availability of land’ and what this means in the Russian 
context. 
Russia is the largest agricultural producer in post-Soviet Eurasia, and worldwide it is one of 
the countries with the largest land reserves for agricultural production, as well as the country 
with the potential for the largest increase in grain production worldwide (World Bank 2010a). 
Russia has one of the highest levels of arable land in the world, namely 0.9 hectares (ha) per 
capita (World Bank 2010a, b). This ratio is higher only in Canada and Australia, but these 
countries have less potential to increase production, as most agricultural land is being used, 
with high land productivity. Moreover, it is to be expected that climate change will reduce the 
acreage of arable land, whereas in Russia the acreage of cultivable land might expand 
northward, for instance. According to the World Bank, water availability will increase (5–15 
percent) in the north of Russia and Kazakhstan (FAO 2011), which may offset the higher 
occurrence of droughts in the south of Russia (HLPE 2011, Dronin and Kirilenko 2011). 
Whereas most countries in the world face declining availability of agricultural and arable land 
per capita, in Russia the availability of land per capita has actually increased over the last two 
decades, because of stagnation of the population2. Moreover, a substantial amount of Russia’s 
agricultural land was taken out of production in the 1990s. According to the president of 
Russia Dmitry Medvedev, the amount of unused or inefficiently used agricultural land may 
total 30 million ha (Wegren 2011, p.152). However, reports differ on the amount of land taken 
out of production (IAMO 2011, Ioffe and Nefedova 2004). This abundance of available 
‘unused’ but often very fertile land has raised the interest of investors, not only of domestic 
investors (the Russian oligarchs amongst others), but also of foreign companies and 
governments. However, whether all of the land classified as such really is ‘unused’ or 
‘abandoned’ needs further scrutiny.  
The phrase ‘global land grab’ has become a catch-all to describe and analyze the current 
explosion of large-scale (trans)national commercial land transactions. Some see land grabs as 
a major threat to the livelihoods of the rural poor and oppose such commercial land deals. 
Others see them as a necessity to modernize agriculture and as an economic opportunity for 
the rural poor, although they are wary of corruption and negative consequences, and hence, 
call for improving land market governance (Borras et al. 2011). Often land grabbing has been 
defined as large-scale land acquisitions by foreigners (GRAIN 2008), but currently a 
substantial share of land grabbing is conducted by domestic investors, or by coalitions of 
foreign and domestic actors. Following Borras et al. (2012), we define land grabbing as ‘the 
large-scale acquisition of land or land-related rights and resources by a corporate, non-profit 
or public buyer for the purposes of resource extraction geared towards external consumers 
(whether external simply means off-site or foreign)’. Extraction and alienation are essential to 
this definition rather than the type of capital invested, the intended market or the act of 
commodification or privatisation of land per se.  
                                                          
2 Russia’s population peaked in the early 1990s (at the time of the end of the Soviet Union) with about 148 
million people in the country. Today, it is approximately 143 million. The United States Census Bureau 
estimates that Russia’s population will decline from the current size to a mere 111 million by 2050, a loss of 
more than 30 million people and a decrease of more than 20 percent (Rosenberg 2012). 
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The widespread farm restructuring and share-based land reform in Russia in the first half of 
the 1990s ‘opened up’ a huge and fertile area of land for investors in agricultural land. 
However, for more than a decade this sparked little interest among investors. The picture 
changed when Russian oligarchs and Western investors started to search for new frontiers of 
investment with domestic economic growth and the influx of Russian offshore capital as well 
as due to the global financial crisis (Jouko and Granberg 2011)3. Moreover, rapidly increasing 
local demand for livestock products (related to demand for grains) in Russia, and subsequent 
legal and policy changes stimulating agricultural investment, caused high demand for 
agricultural land. Large-scale land investments became popular among Russian and foreign 
companies. Foreigners are not officially allowed to acquire agricultural land in Russia. 
However, they do so by means of their Russian subsidiaries, which are considered as Russian 
domestic companies by Russian law. ‘We are seeing a land grab bigger than anywhere else in 
the world, and it has attracted a mighty cast of characters’, stated Kingsmill Bond, a chief 
strategist at the Moscow Brokerage firm Troika Dialog (Kandell 2009). 
This current rush of investors for land (and the earlier experience with industry) raises serious 
concerns about the transparency, inclusiveness and fairness of land acquisitions. There is a 
danger of widespread dispossession of rural inhabitants who recently acquired entitlements to 
property in the form of land shares in the ‘cosmetically’ privatised, large-scale successors of 
the state and collective farms, which are developing into megafarms. Will land grabbing cause 
rural dwellers to lose their land rights, soon after they received them in the 1990s? In the 
absence of studies on land grabbing in the former Soviet Union, we know relatively little of 
the various effects.  
This paper focuses on the investors in land and their strategies. However, effects of these land 
acquisitions for the rural population regarding land ownership (and potential dispossession) 
will also be addressed. We focus on the main players in the Russian land market and the 
strategies and mechanisms they use for land acquisition, such as deliberate bankruptcy of 
collective farms in order to buy their lands, the massive purchase of land shares acquisition 
after land law (2002), and using the inequality in power relations. Finally, the role of the 
Russian state vis-à-vis large-scale land acquisitions is discussed.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section, the specificities of research on land 
grabbing in Russia are described, with special attention to difficulties with data collection. In 
the third section, it will be shown that the land rights (‘shares’) the population received during 
the restructuring of state and collective farms were rather insecure, which facilitated land 
grabbing later on. The fourth section investigates the magnitude of the large-scale land 
acquisitions in Russia, and the actors and structures behind them, such as Russian oligarchs, 
megafarms and foreign investors.  
Section five looks at the motivations of investors and the land acquisition strategies that are 
used to avoid different restrictions on land sales in legal (using loopholes in Russian 
legislation) and illegal ways. The sixth section looks at the issue of abandoned land, land 
reserves and dying villages, distinguishing between discourse and reality. Section seven 
analyses land accumulation strategies and responses of rural dwellers attempting to counter or 
mitigate unfair land acquisition. In section eight the role of the Russian state in the facilitation 
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it stimulated, globally as well as in Russia, a major shift of capital towards the agri-food sector, and the primary 
sector more broadly. 
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of land grabbing is analysed, which is often crucial. Finally, the concluding section looks at 
land grabbing in Russia in the years to come, arguing that it is expected to continue at great 
pace, and that proposed government interventions to constrain land grabbing will likely not 
prevent illegal land acquisitions, and might even have adverse effects.  
 
2. Doing research on land grabbing in Russia: data resources 
To study land grabbing empirically in Russia is complex. The information about domestic and 
foreign land transactions provided by Russian statistical institutions such as Rosstat and the 
cadastral agency Rosreestr is incomplete and provides only general information about land 
ownership and usage. Furthermore, the rapid increase in international transactions in 
agricultural land renders available information quickly outdated (Visser and Spoor 2011b). 
Moreover, according to Uzun et al. (2009), statistics on landholdings and land deals are 
collected at the agricultural enterprise level and are generally not available for agroholdings 
(Uzun et al. 2009), which are the crucial actors in land acquisitions. An agroholding includes 
a number of agricultural organisations whose controlling blocks of shares are owned by the 
holding company. It acts as an umbrella for the subordinated (not necessarily only 
agricultural) units and controls their policies and management. Agroholdings often combine 
agricultural production enterprises with other upstream and downstream firms in the agri-food 
chain, such as producers of concentrated fodder, elevators, processing units and wholesalers. 
As a rule, investors (both domestic and foreign) invest in Russian land via agroholdings. 
There are no databases in Russia that include full information about Russian agroholdings, 
their capital or the acreage they control. As these agroholdings are currently the main actors in 
the land grabbing process, this shortcoming seriously complicates research on land grabbing 
in Russia. However, even with more statistical data at this level, the reliability of such data 
would be questionable due to the lack of transparency of Russian agroholdings and the 
concealed nature of much of the domestic and foreign investment that is taking place.  
Therefore, in this paper we study land grabbing based on the following methods. First, 
through continuing our web research: gathering many dispersed pieces of information from 
the Russian media, reviews in web journals, and examining web pages of agroholdings and 
foreign investment funds operating in Russia. Second, we held in-depth interviews with 
leaders of some foreign and domestic agroholdings operating in Russia, government officials, 
rural inhabitants and representatives of emerging rural movements (Visser 2010, Visser and 
Mamonova 2011)4. Within the scope of this research paper we can only pay limited attention 
to the regional differences in land acquisitions within Russia and aim to focus on some of the 
general tendencies. For studies that deal extensively with regional differences we refer to the 
work by Pallot and Nefedova (2007) that covers a wide range of regions, as well as the work 
                                                          
4 Most of the interviews were conducted by Mamonova and Visser in the autumn of 2010 and winter and spring 
of 2011 in the Moscow region. Most of the agroholdings which were included in the research have (or formerly 
had) foreign investment, and operate in multiple Russian regions. The paper also benefited from interviews with 
foreign investors conducted by Steggerda and Visser in the autumn of 2011 and winter of 2012. Michelle 
Steggerda is an honours student in the department of Anthropology and Development Studies, Radboud 
University Nijmegen. Finally, the paper uses data from interviews with domestic and foreign investors in 
agriculture conducted earlier by Visser in the Moscow, Rostov, Pskov and Saint Petersburg regions. Among the 
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peasants’ rights, in the face of land dispossession by large-scale investors. 
This article is published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of Peasant Studies on 28 May 2012, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066150.2012.675574#.VeCmAPmqqko . To cite this article: Visser, O., 
N. Mamonova and M.Spoor (2012)  ‘Oligarchs, megafarms and land reserves: understanding land grabbing in Russia’, 
Journal of Peasant Studies 39:3-4, pp.899-931   
4 
 
of Visser (2006, 2008) and Lindner (2008), which provides a close up study of farm 
enterprises in three contrasting regions.  
 
3. Post-Soviet land reform: the political economy of insecurity 
       3.1. Post-Soviet land reform after 1991 
The Russian land reform was aimed at changing ownership of farmland from state into private 
property, while the dominant large state and collective farms were to be restructured towards 
‘individualized’ production. No land restitution policy was followed as it was not possible to 
determine who the previous land owners were before the forced collectivisation of farms and 
the nationalisation of land in the 1930s. This was only done in the Baltics and in some 
countries of Central Europe. Moreover, the collectivisation had often been carried out 
together with imprisonment, deportation and killing of numerous ‘rich’ peasant farmers (the 
so-called kulaks). The various farm enlargement campaigns in the later Soviet period were 
accompanied by multiple relocations of rural settlements, further adding to the alienation of 
the rural population from their former or ancestral land. Therefore, among both policy makers 
and the rural population, there was no serious interest for restitution of land to the pre-
communist owners. Instead, land was to be distributed equally among the current rural 
inhabitants (World Bank 1992), although, as we will see below, this was not done in a 
physical sense, but through share-based entitlements to land (Spoor and Visser 2001). 
In the early 1990s only one percent of the agricultural land was privately used (these were the 
subsidiary household plots of the employees on the state and collective farms). The other 99 
percent of land belonged to the state (Poshkus 2009, p.68). This situation changed 
dramatically with the post-1991 land reform. Land was given to the former kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes (collective and state farms) for further distribution among their members in the 
form of paper shares. During that time investors in agriculture were not able to buy land, but 
they were not completely passive. Some of them waited until the end of this moratorium 
(2002), in the meantime making contacts with the management of attractive farms and 
lobbying with local authorities. 
Land reform in Russia was carried out in two stages. First, in 1990 the law ‘On land reform’ 
focused on taking 10 percent of kolkhoz and sovkhoz land and transferring it to local 
authorities for distribution among peasants who were willing to establish a private family 
farm. However, at the end of 1992 there were only 50,000 private family farms that owned 
less than 1 percent of agricultural land. According to Poshkus (2009, p.68) problems arose 
due to the unwillingness of kolkhoz leadership to hand over the land to local authorities and 
the lack of understanding of land reform among peasants. Second, at the end of 1991 the 
Presidential Decree No. 323 (‘On urgent measures for the implementation of land reform in 
the RSFSR5’) was issued by the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin. This involved the 
transformation of state and collective farms into new juridical forms (mostly closed joint-
stock companies or CJSC) with the employees becoming ‘shareholders’. Subsequently, each 
employee received non-land asset shares and land shares (on average three to fifteen ha) for 
free. However, the shares did not include real, individual ownership. The land shares that 
employees received were paper certificates, that substantiated their rights to unspecified land 
                                                          
5 The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) is the republic of the former Soviet Union, which 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was renamed the Russian Federation. 
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plots on the territory of their former state or collective (Poshkus 2009, p.68, Spoor and Visser 
2001). Gustav Wetterling (Agro-Invest Group – a subsidiary of Swedish Black Earth Farming 
Ltd) calls this process ‘semi-privatisation’, meaning that peasants didn’t become real owners 
of the land, as they only received the right to be owners (Interview, 23 September 2010, 
Moscow). 
Ownership of such land could occur in two cases. First, the peasant transferred his/her land 
share to the charter capital of the restructured farm enterprise. In this case, land became 
property of the farm. Second, the peasant created a separate private farm, by registering the 
land as his/her ownership. However, private land registration required significant time and 
financial resources due to the highly bureaucratic system in the country. According to 
Poshkus (2009, p.69) the main weakness of the reform was ‘the problem with the definition of 
land rights and their usage’. This provided a loophole facilitating future land grabbing in 
Russia and is increasingly generating land conflicts in the country. However, more clearly 
defined property rights alone would not have been a solution, as land reform took place in a 
situation in which markets were still in the making, political interference remained strong, and 
distribution of power was highly unequal (Spoor and Visser 2004).  
During President Vladimir Putin’s first term the Federal Law N136-FZ ‘Land Code of 
Russian Federation’ (2001) was adopted that modified property rights for land with the 
exception of agricultural land, and in 2002, the Federal Law N 101-FZ ‘On Agricultural Land 
Transactions’ came into force. This law specified procedures for selling agricultural land and 
served as a template for regional legislation (Wegren 2009b). Tamara Semenova (vice-
president of the peasant movement Krestyanskiy Front) suggests that this law ‘was lobbied by 
a group of oligarchs who had already bought or planned to buy land. This law was worked out 
to legalize their purchases’ (Interview, 29 September 2010, Moscow). During Putin’s second 
term (2004–2008), Russian and foreign investors became interested in agricultural land and 
commenced buying land shares. 
 
       3.2. High costs of land registration 
Land reform in Russia during the 1990s did not lead to clearly defined land rights and tenure 
security. According to Lerman and Shagaida (2007), most (84 percent) of the peasant farmers 
in the more agriculturally developed regions in Russia regarded first, complex procedures of 
land transactions, and second, high registration costs as major problems in the development of 
their farming operations. In order to register their land, peasants had (and have) to pass three 
organisational levels: the aforementioned district committees, cadastral chambers and 
registration chambers.  
After this long procedure the land shares are transferable: they can be leased or sold, 
transferring the rights to the underlying acreage to another operator or owner. However, 
peasants have to spend considerable costs to pass through the entire procedure. ‘Often people 
in remote areas do not even have money in order to formalize their land shares’, as Tamara 
Semenova of Krestyanskiy Front stated (Interview, 29 September 2010, Moscow). First 
Deputy Premier Viktor Zubkov revealed in February 2009 that of the 12 million land 
shareholders, only 400,000 have been able to register their land plots. With the emergence of 
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outside investors (see next section), the weaknesses of land reform in securing land rights of 
the rural population have become more and more apparent6. 
 
4. The magnitude of land grabbing and the types of actors involved 
      4.1. Domestic investors 
In the 1990s, most Russian companies considered the agricultural sector as unprofitable and 
preferred to invest in other branches, while interest from foreign investors was also limited 
(with a few exceptions; see below). The new Russian government sharply curtailed 
investment in the agriculture sector (Barnes 2006) and the large farm enterprises (LFEs), 
successors of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, faced severe financial difficulties. 
The privatisation of oil, gas, and mineral resources and industry sectors in the early 1990s led 
to a rush to acquire former state enterprises. A fierce struggle for the most prized assets 
evolved between the Russian oligarchs and sometimes between worker collectives and 
oligarchs. Later, foreign investors and the Russian state (especially in the oil sector) became 
involved in this struggle over acquisition of property (Barnes 2006). However, as indicated 
above, land reform had been ‘largely cosmetic’, involving little more than ‘changing the name 
plate of the farm’ (Brooks et al. 1996). Comparing agrarian property transformation in the 
1990s with privatisation in other sectors, Barnes wrote that: 
…the struggles in the sector could also seem underwhelming, lacking even the guilty 
fascination provoked by the decadence of conflicts in industry. [...] Private farmers did 
not drive around Moscow in Mercedes cars or pull rolls of hundred-dollar bills from their 
pockets in casinos. Newspapers did not brim with stories of upstart speculators battling 
corrupt managers and organized crime bosses for control over agricultural production. 
Instead, the sector often seemed interesting only for its pity value (2006, 141).  
Indeed, Russian agriculture was in dire straits (with roughly 80 percent of the farm enterprises 
incurring losses by the mid-1990s). The market-oriented agrarian reform took place in a 
period of sharp economic decline of the economy at large and drastic cuts in government 
spending on agriculture in particular (Wegren 2009a, 2011). In the 1990s land prices were 
very low and often land even had a negative value because of costs in the form of land tax and 
informal social obligations attached to land, such as to provide feed for private livestock of 
the villagers or provide social infrastructure (Visser 2006). During this period the sparse 
outside ‘investors’ (from outside the agribusiness sector) who took over farm enterprises did 
so often with the goal of asset stripping. Equipment and buildings were sold off, while the 
land was mostly left unused (Kalugina and Fadeeva 2009).  
Due to the dire straits of the large farm enterprises, part of their lands ended up in the hands of 
creditors in order to pay off farm debts, in particular to suppliers of fuel such as the energy 
giants Gazprom and Lukoil (Barnes 2006, p.161). The first substantial agricultural land bank, 
operated by Gazprom, started when farm enterprises were unable to cover their fuel debts and 
had to pay back with their land. The total property of Gazprom is more than 500,000 ha. 
Gazprom is currently engaged in a process of selling off its agricultural land again, as the 
                                                          
6 This large gap between the number of unregistered and registered land shares/plots indicates that there is still 
widespread tenure insecurity. 
This article is published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of Peasant Studies on 28 May 2012, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066150.2012.675574#.VeCmAPmqqko . To cite this article: Visser, O., 
N. Mamonova and M.Spoor (2012)  ‘Oligarchs, megafarms and land reserves: understanding land grabbing in Russia’, 
Journal of Peasant Studies 39:3-4, pp.899-931   
7 
 
company was not successful in agribusiness due to the absence of skills and knowledge in 
agriculture (Uzun et al. 2009). 
‘Attendant with strong economic growth that ensued from 1999 through 2007, land began to 
be perceived as a valuable commodity from which to build wealth. Agricultural land became 
the new frontier for those with money’ (Wegren 2009b, p.3). New changes in Russian land 
laws, focusing on attracting direct and indirect investments to the agricultural sector by 
guaranteeing private property rights on the land, gave impetus to the creation of large-scale 
agroholdings or megafarms at the expense of rural dwellers. In Russia most agricultural land 
continues to be controlled by LFEs, and since the early 2000s, a growing percentage of these 
are controlled by large agroholdings and corporations, previously state- and now privately 
owned.  
According to the All-Russian Agricultural Census of 2006, private family farmers owned only 
13 percent of agricultural land in Russia in 2005 and household plots accounted for less than 5 
percent (Rosstat 2006, p.36). All other land is controlled by LFEs and agroholdings, both 
national and international, although a large share of this land is still formally in the hands of 
(former) employees cum shareholders7. Nearly 60 percent of agricultural land is now privately 
owned, but most of this land (51 percent) is represented by land shares – pieces of paper 
corresponding to virtual plots of specified size in an unspecified location (Lerman and 
Shagaida 2007). These land shares are transferable: they can be leased or sold, transferring the 
rights to the underlying acreage to another operator or owner. Only 6 percent of agricultural 
land is in the form of physically demarcated plots, (that means land shares which were 
actually registered by the possessor), most of it owned by individuals (household plots and 
peasant farms) (Lerman and Shagaida 2007).  
The number of agroholdings (as well as the size of their landholdings) has rapidly increased 
since the early 2000s. According to the Russian Ministry of Agriculture in 2003, more than 90 
agroholdings were active in 25 regions. By 2006, 319 private agroholdings were already 
registered (Uzun et al. 2009, p.159). By the mid-2000s in various fertile Black Earth regions, 
such as Belgorod, Lipetsk, Voronezh and Tambov, there was practically no ‘free’ land 
available that was not yet controlled by an agroholding (Didenko 2009). By mid-2008, 
according to the Institute for Agricultural Market Studies, 196 large agroholdings controlled 
11.5 million ha (BEFL 2010, p.9). Of these agroholdings, 32 had landholdings of over 
100,000 ha.  
It is hard to say how many land transactions are conducted in Russia exactly, let alone those 
of specifically agricultural land. But definitely the number of land transactions is growing. In 
the mid-2000s about five percent of agricultural land was transacted annually (Shagaida 
2005), a figure which has risen further in the last few years to at least eight percent (see Table 
2) with a strong rise in the number of land deals (25 percent in 2009) between citizens and 
legal entities. These data of course do not include shady, unregistered deals8. 
 
                                                          
7 Also, individual entrepreneurs account for about 1.5 percent of agricultural land. A small part of the land used 
by large-scale farm enterprises is still owned by the state. 
8 In 2010 the upward trend was temporary affected by the financial crisis. According to some estimates, the 
registered transactions in 2010 were almost a third less than during the same period before the crisis of 2008, due 
to problems of investors with financing land deals in context of the global financial crisis, which hit Russia hard. 
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       4.2. Foreign land acquisitions: a brief overview 
Foreign land acquisitions are clearly on the rise in Russia since the mid-2000s (Visser and 
Spoor 2011a), although already in the mid-1990s some Western companies attempted to enter 
Russian agribusiness. However, it is hard quantify foreign land acquisitions. Foreign 
companies are not allowed to directly buy land.  
The Federal Law N136-FZ ‘Land Code’ (2001) prohibits ownership of agricultural land by 
foreign citizens and companies, as well as Russian companies with foreigners owning more 
than 50 percent of the shares. To avoid the application of this law, foreign investors establish 
Russian subsidiaries that are legally not regarded as foreign companies (a strategy which is 
actively promoted by the Russian government, as will be shown in a later section). According 
to our most recent estimates, roughly 50 foreign companies control up to an estimated 3.5 
million ha of Russian agricultural land. However, accumulation of land is a highly sensitive 
issue for both the leasing and the hosting countries, and therefore it is likely that the process 
of land grabbing in post-Soviet Eurasia has advanced further than official statements and 
media reports suggest (Billette 2009, Visser and Spoor 2011a). In terms of the total size of the 
agricultural land obtained, Russia is not a top target of foreign investment, but investment by 
outside investors is indeed substantial and the size of average land deals, including actually 
implemented ones, is very large. Having access to large financial resources, foreign investors 
acquire the most fertile land, use modern technology to achieve high productivity, and take 
leading positions in regional and sometimes even national markets. 
 
Table 2: Land Transactions (sale and lease) in Russia (2006-2009) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Transactions with state and municipalities 
Number of transactions  3 921 393 3 875 650 3 985 846 3 887 691 
Change in amount 
 
-1% 3% -2% 
Amount of land (ha) in 
transactions 
105 214 779 114 622 029 115 351 558 114 018 863 
Approx ha per deal 27 30 29 29 
Transactions between citizens and companies 
Number of transactions 623 747 643 443 794 792 996 462 
Change in amount 
 
3% 24% 25% 
Amount of land (ha) in 
transactions  
1 231 830 1 221 829 2 415 179 18 761 609 
Approx ha per deal 2 2 3 19 
Total transactions 
Number of transactions: 4 545 140 4 519 093 4 780 638 4 884 153 
Change in amount 
 
-1% 6% 2% 
Amount of land (ha) in 106 446 609 115 843 859 117 766 738 132 780 473 
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transaction 
Total amount of land  
Total amount of land in 
Russia 
1 709 800 000 1 709 800 000 1 709 800 000 1 709 800 000 
Total amount of 
agricultural land in 
Russia   
402 300 000 400 000 000 
Land transacted as % of 
the total amount of land 
in Russia 
    7% 8% 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Rosreestr (2010). 
Notes: Land transactions include buying, selling or leasing of all categories of land: 
agricultural land, settlement, industrial land, special protected land, forest, and reserved land. 
Therefore, we calculated land transacted as percentage of the total amount of land in Russia, 
which somewhat understates the share of land transacted. However, if we would consider the 
land in transaction as only agricultural land, we would arrive at nearly 30 percent of 
agricultural land being bought, sold or leased per year in Russia, which likely overstates the 
percentage transacted. 
 
The origins of the companies that are interested in Russian land acquisitions are quite diverse. 
Roughly we can distinguish the Western companies investing primarily in the European part 
of Russia, and the Asian (most notably Chinese companies) in Siberia and the Far East9 of 
Russia (Visser and Spoor 2011b). Investors from the Middle East (in particular from the Gulf 
States) have only been searching for land in some of the former Soviet republics very recently 
and have not yet concluded major deals (Visser and Spoor 2011b). Until now Gulf States 
investors have focused more on Ukraine and Kazakhstan rather than Russia. When discussing 
the origin of investors it is important to realize that the identity of investors might be different, 
and more complex, than what it seems at a first glance. Various recent studies in Africa have 
shown that what appears to be foreign investment is in fact investment by representatives of 
the diaspora from the target country. Furthermore, Hall (2012) has shown that the widespread 
land acquisitions by South African investors across the African continent are often indirectly 
based on Chinese investments in South African companies that are funding these acquisitions. 
Part of what seems like foreign investment appears to consist of investment by Russian 
oligarchs (Visser and Spoor 2011a). 
Finally, a note about the aim/orientation of foreign farmland acquisitions. Globally an 
important share of the large-scale farmland acquisitions is not (solely) for food or fodder but 
also for biofuel production, for instance in Brazil and large parts of Africa10. In Russia, the 
share of land acquisitions aimed at biofuels production is rather insignificant. Various factors 
                                                          
9 The Russian Far East concerns the easternmost parts of Russia, between Lake Baikal in Eastern Siberia and the 
Pacific Ocean. In Russia, the region is usually referred to as just the ‘Far East’. 
10 Disentangling the food, fodder and biofuel functions of agricultural production is sometimes difficult, as it 
consists in part of ‘flex crops’ which can be used for multiple purposes. 
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seem to play a role here. Russia, which is itself a prime oil and gas exporter with low internal 
fuel prices, does not actively stimulate biofuel production as is done, for instance, in Brazil 
and the USA. This makes the Russian case special, although the mechanisms of land grabbing 
are often comparable. Foreign investors who want to produce biofuels for export (mainly to 
the nearby EU) prefer Ukraine, which has better port infrastructure and a government that is 
more interested in stimulating biofuel production and processing, being very oil-dependent on 
neighbouring Russia11.  
 
5. Motivations for large-scale land deals: finance and the political economy of the land 
rush in Russia 
The recent land rush in Russia has clear characteristics of a new frontier for investors. In the 
creation of this new frontier, global factors play a role (such as the financial crisis and the 
search for an inflation hedge) but domestic factors seem to be more decisive. Also domestic 
land acquisitions predominate over foreign ones.  
After the slump of the 1990s, the Russian economy has shown impressive growth rates 
throughout most of the 2000s and demand for high quality food products, such as livestock 
products, is continuously rising. An important factor on the supply side is the large amount of 
capital in the hands of the Russian oligarchs, which after the appropriation of the energy and 
industry sectors are looking for new frontiers of development. Whereas in the 1990s they 
transferred their capital to tax havens in the West, with the economic recovery of the 2000s 
these oligarchs increasingly started investing their offshore capital again in Russia. By 2002, a 
senior economist of the Moscow Brokerage firm Aton Capital Group concluded, ‘Russians 
are starting to trust Russia’ and therefore ‘money is coming back’ (Starobin and Belton 2002).  
The land rush can be seen as part of the larger ‘hunt for the Next Big Thing’, the new 
accumulation drive that started in the 2000s with the privatisation of assets which were left in 
state ownership in the 1990s, such as railways, electricity and financial services (Starobin and 
Belton 2002). The Russian state plays an important role in enabling the boom in large-scale 
land acquisitions, in legal terms by adopting the 2002 land law allowing free sale of land and, 
even more important, by financial stimulation through mechanisms that lower taxes and 
increase subsidised loans. 
The fact that the current boom in agriculture takes the form of large-scale land acquisitions 
with the predominance of huge agroholdings is often portrayed as an inevitable process or the 
most efficient mode of farming for Russia, by investors and authorities alike. While it is true 
that the Russian landscape and the crops cultivated allow for a high degree of mechanisation 
and economies of scale, there are also various diseconomies of scale associated with these 
large farm enterprises (Nikulin 2005, Visser 2006, 2008), such as those related to monitoring 
costs. Another justification for large-scale land acquisitions and mega-farming given by the 
major actors in Russia is that the rural population is not willing to take up independent 
farming, that small or medium private family farms are not a feasible form of production, or 
do not have the finances to expand and modernise production. ‘Today only agro-industrial 
holdings can be profitable in farming, because it requires huge financial resources’, stated 
                                                          
11 In addition, a probably unexpected motivation for biofuel production is the following: in Ukraine biofuel 
production is used as a means to generate value from the Northern area around Chernobyl, which due to the 
radioactive contamination can no longer be used for food and/or fodder production. 
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Zorigto Sakhanov, chairman of Agro-Invest Group, the subsidiary of Swedish Black Earth 
Farming (Bush 2008).  
Indeed, the growth of private farms has been below expectations. However, it is important to 
stress that many of the farmers face obstacles which are not simple natural problems related to 
their size, but a direct problem of a political economy (and government policy) targeted at 
large-scale farming (Visser 2008). The lack of investment in extension services, as well as the 
large-scale nature of input and output channels, form obstacles for private farms (Visser 
2008). Further, some regional authorities have set limitations on the minimum size of land 
deals, such as in Krasnodar Krai where there is a threshold of 300 ha for land deals, hindering 
the emergence and expansion of small and medium sized farms.  
A very important factor that skews the agricultural boom towards large-scale farming is the 
financial system. There is an urgent lack of accessible finance/credit. Obtaining loans is 
virtually only possible through take-over and capitalisation by rich investors who have built 
up their capital in another sector, or via statesubsidised credit. Most commercial banks are 
more vehicles for the investment projects of oligarchs than accessible sources of credit. 
Interest rates are very high and agricultural land is mostly not accepted as collateral. 
Furthermore, banks are generally not much oriented toward agriculture. 
From the early 2000s, the state has increased finance for the agricultural sector. A network of 
state-owned and operated banks for agribusiness was set up, but in some regions these bank 
branches were only established when agriculture had already virtually disappeared. State-
subsidised loans have been targeted predominantly towards large farm enterprises, and within 
this group, towards the largest and most successful ones. For instance, Uzun (2005) states that 
‘1.4 percent of the largest corporate farms received 22.5 percent of all subsidies’. Also, the 
more indirect forms of subsidisation seem to stimulate mostly the largest LFEs12. Various 
requirements of the loans, such as the need for matching of resources and often brief 
repayment terms, skew the loans towards the largest farm enterprises. Due to the 
abovementioned problems, it is difficult to develop agriculture without investors that already 
gained capital in lucrative sectors outside agribusiness. Whereas in the 1990s, the few 
investors in agriculture and land were mostly coming from that sector (food processors, food 
wholesalers, or providers of inputs for farming), now they often do not have any existing link 
to the sector. 
 
      5.1. Motivations for large-scale land acquisitions 
The precise motivations of outside investors/oligarchs to acquire land are not easy to discover 
since the whole process is highly non-transparent, not least for the villagers, who often know 
little more than that ‘a rich investor from Moscow’ obtained their land (D’Hamecourt 2010, 
p.13). However, it is clear, as we will elaborate below, that the current land rush cannot be 
explained sufficiently by economic incentives or rising food demand only, and we will 
proceed to disentangle a few other factors. With regard to the global food prices and land grab 
debate, several authors have argued that the idea of the growing global population and rising 
food demand as an explanation for rising food prices and subsequently the drive for land 
acquisitions is a mystification of reality (Jouko and Granberg 2011). This is clearly the case 
                                                          
12 However, it should be noted that by the mid-2000s the national budget for the first time since the mid-1990s 
set aside a substantial amount of subsidies for household plots and private farms (Wegren 2007). 
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for Russia. Except for the more obvious economic reasons for investment, such as increased 
demand for livestock products, and aspects of investment portfolio management (integration, 
differentiation and risk-spreading), there are several other motivations for investment. The 
following will be discussed: high subsidies, speculation, state pressure and state-business 
agreements, tax evasion and money laundering.  
 
      5.1.1. High subsidies 
Acquiring land and investing in agriculture has been made attractive by the policy of the 
Russian government. Since the early 2000s the state has stimulated agriculture through a 
range of instruments such as a debt restructuring programme, the establishment of a state-
financed agricultural bank, subsidised crop insurance programmes, simplified and lowered 
taxes on agriculture, and subsidised loans for capital investment (Wegren 2007, p.517). 
Whereas in the 1990s subsidies for the agricultural sector were sharply curtailed, under Putin, 
from 2006 onwards, agriculture became one of the four priorities of the ‘national project’. The 
government set ambitious goals for domestic food security, targeting first of all the livestock 
sector, which experienced the most dramatic decline during the 1990s. As a result, cheap, 
state-subsidised credit is available for investments in livestock and especially dairy 
production. Asked about the motivations of the investors he had worked with, a Dutch interim 
farm manager and consultant, Han van Riel, who has worked in several agroholdings in 
Russia, answered: 
…it could be, normally you get 10 million from the state, with a guarantee by Putin. The 
interest rate is zero percent’. […] Yes, there are enormous funds. Look, normally the 
interest rate is 15 to 16 percent. But then it is zero percent (Han van Riel, Interview, 16 
November 2011, The Netherlands).  
Western observers often hasten to characterise state intervention in Russia as a legacy of, or 
return to, the Soviet past, but it is more productive to see it as an example of the wider global 
tendency of various states to stimulate a boom in agriculture. Whereas in some countries the 
subsidies focus on biofuel/diesel and energy security (such as the biofuel (corn) subsidies in 
the US, or biodiesel policies in Germany), in Russia, as a major fossil energy exporter and a 
weak food (livestock) producer, the subsidies focus on livestock production.  
 
      5.1.2. Speculation and land conversion  
Land brokers and representatives of agroholdings searching for investment widely mention 
the expected value appreciation of agricultural land in Russia. Also, part of the land is 
obtained in order to sell it off later with a large premium as land for construction sites (in a 
later section several such cases will be discussed):  
I have, […] tried to cultivate cabbage, on 20,000 ha, for a real estate agent. He wanted it 
in ownership, at least, the right of usage. But he had to cultivate it, otherwise he would 
not get it […]. Just what I thought. At least 50 to 80 percent of his territory is now 
expansion area for construction for Moscow for the next 25 years. He knew that already 
by then. Thus, yes, for him it was just to have it, due to its location in Moscow [region]… 
(Han van Riel, Interview, 16 November 2011, The Netherlands). 
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     5.1.3. Pressure by the government 
Furthermore, many political and other, often hidden, motives seem to play a role, such as 
creating loyalty and political support among regional governors and a tacit agreement with the 
Kremlin, which seems to have promised not to investigate the dubious practices of the 
oligarchs in return for their investment in the countryside (Boldyrev 2001, p.21). Interviews 
with consultants in agriculture suggested that regional authorities made agreements with the 
largest oligarchs that the latter should invest in the cumbersome agricultural sector in return 
for earlier or forthcoming privileges such as tax breaks, cheap credit or other forms of state 
support (Visser 2008). Obviously it is difficult to find clear evidence for such influence, but 
anecdotal evidence suggests that this indeed played a role. The quoted Dutch interim farm 
manager confirmed this pressure: ‘I think one of the motives is the choice you have: either 
you pay tax arrears or you start producing food’ (Han van Riel, Interview, 16 November 
2011, The Netherlands). 
For instance, one investor, the director of a fur factory described by Kalugina and Fadeeva, 
started to invest in a near-bankrupt farm enterprise after multiple requests by the district 
authorities, with promises of state support and privileges for its development. The investor 
described the interaction: ‘The district head insisted that I who come there [to invest]. He said 
‘‘nobody except from you can revive this enterprise’’. I tried several times to run away from 
it’ (quoted in Kalugina and Fadeeva, 2009, p.165). A German investor even stated that ‘the 
land was almost forced on us’ (Winter 2012).  
 
     5.1.4. Tax evasion and money laundering 
Furthermore, tax evasion, and probably money laundering, seems to play a role (Boldyrev 
2001). Agriculture is a complex sector, with large fluctuations in production and profitability 
year to year, which allowed for extensive creative accounting already in the Soviet period 
(Visser and Kalb 2010). Furthermore, the tax on agricultural production is low to virtually 
zero. 
 
 
6. Abandoned land, dying villages and investment: discourse and reality  
Whereas the previous section looked into the motivations behind the land rush, this section 
will turn to a major topic in the legitimisation of these deals: the concept of ‘abandoned’, 
‘unused’ or ‘available’ land.  
 
      6.1. The discourse of abandoned land 
The idea of widely available abandoned land waiting to be (re)cultivated is very widespread 
among media and investors describing the Russian countryside:  
You should take the car. Drive to the North, [further] across Belarus, and then towards 
the South, Smolensk, and in the direction of Moscow. Or even go further. […] Then you 
will meet millions of hectares which are just abandoned. Nobody is living there anymore 
(Interview with Dutch consultant/farmer Han van Riel, 16 November 2011, The 
Netherlands). 
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and: 
Back then this tradition-rich region was on its knees. The giant state agricultural 
collectives of the Soviet era were all bankrupt; their ancient equipment was in disrepair, 
and their land stood largely fallow. Young people fled to urban areas, leaving behind 
aging parents, decrepit farm houses and weed-choked gardens. Today, however, the 
region has burst to life. The capitalist upheaval that years ago began sweeping through 
Russia’s big cities and oil and gas fields has finally made its way to the country’s rural 
heartland. Newly imported tractors and harvesters with the latest ground-positioning 
satellite systems navigate vast privatized estates, producing bumper crops of wheat, 
barley, rapeseed, sugar beets and corn. (Kandell 2009, 1) 
The director of the largest German investor in Russian agriculture (Ekoniva) states: We 
change the attitude to land. In every farm we start restoring abandoned, neglected, often 
uncultivated lands and some points which were marked as fields on the map even appeared to 
be forest-belts in reality (Zaslavskaya 2010).  
 
      6.2. Is a win-win situation possible? 
If anywhere, it would appear that a ‘win-win’ situation proposed by investors and for example 
studies such as World Bank (2010a) on land deals would be possible in Russia. A few features 
of agriculture in Russia suggest, at a first glance, that this is indeed the case. First, in general 
there is no food shortage or hunger. Russia is even a main exporter of grain (although 
importer of livestock products). 
Second, much land is not cultivated. Indeed, rates of land that turned from agriculture into 
non-agriculture were very high in Russia in the 1990s, with this process already starting in the 
1980s during the last decade of the Soviet Union (Ioffe and Nefedova 2004). Prishchepov et 
al. (forthcoming) show, based on detailed Landsat satellite data, that 52 percent of agricultural 
land in the North-Western Smolensk region was ‘abandoned’ between 1989 and 2000. Ioffe, 
Nefedova and Zaslavsky (2006) estimate that about 30 percent of Russia’s rural settlements 
‘have either died out or are about to do so’. Ioffe and Nefedova (2004) suggest that as a rule 
farm enterprises are not profitable in areas where population density drops below 10 people 
per square kilometre. Low population density, an aging rural population, and out-migration of 
working-age people all confirm the image of abandoned land. Ioffe, Nefedova and Zaslavsky 
(2004, p.934) even speak about ‘black holes’ in the countryside. In some villages most of the 
titles to land were in the name of people who had disappeared or owners who had died. In one 
district, Shagaida (2005) found that nearly half of the land shares were owned by people who 
had died13.  
Third, the population often appears willing to rent out or sell the land. A farm consultant for 
large-scale farms in Russia states:  
Indeed many do sell their land. Some [of the rural population] do nothing with their land, 
which is just laying fallow. They don’t get any revenue from it. And as I just said, if they 
hand it over to the large enterprise – let me put it that way – then they get some return 
                                                          
13 In addition to an indication of aging in the countryside, it is also an indication of the difficulties of registering 
land for rural dwellers. 
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from it. They earn something from it (Simon de Schutter, Interview, 13 January 2012, 
Holten, the Netherlands). 
There is no widespread desire to become an independent farmer. In fact, in the 1990s, when 
some new independent family farmers emerged, a large share of the population was quite 
hostile to these efforts as they feared for the break-up of the LFEs and the loss of their low-
paid, but until then ‘secure’, jobs and the whole social infrastructure, pensions, etc., connected 
to it (Visser 2008). The majority of the working-age people (and a lot of people above pension 
age trying to supplement their low pensions) prefer to have a job at a LFE. Consequently, 
many of them are indeed happy if an investor approaches them to buy or rent the shares with 
the promise to lift up production and re-create employment. Quite a large part of the 
population is above working age and would physically be unable to work the land.  
 
     6.3. A critique of the discourse of abandoned land 
Despite the arguments above, one should not jump to the conclusion that therefore land 
acquisitions in Russia cannot be but beneficial for rural dwellers next to the investor. 
First, empty or uncultivated land is predominantly in the north (with poorer soils, and worse 
climatic circumstances) where hardly any investors are interested in obtaining land, with the 
exception of land near the large cities (Uzun 2011). In the well-endowed south, there is fallow 
land in the peripheral regions but here investors are also mostly not interested in obtaining 
land. A Dutch farmer/investor, who on a trip to Russia in search for agricultural land, met 
with a mayor showing him a potential investment site, stated in an interview: 
…we said, ok, that is not worth investing in anymore. If we want to start with a big unit, 
than we like to build it near a big road. There we have good infrastructure… [...] we 
didn’t want to build it in the village. We wanted to put it in the middle of the fields. That 
works most efficient (Farmer De Boer, Interview, 13 January 2012, The Netherlands)14.  
Second, when land is not cultivated it does not mean that land is unused. Often villagers do 
use it in some ways and have (informal) entitlements to land for functions other than 
agricultural cultivation, involving such functions as grazing, hunting, bee keeping and 
mushroom or berry collection. It is important to note that in the Soviet era, a symbiosis 
existed between the collective farm and the household plots of the employees and other 
villagers (see Visser 2006). Households were mostly allowed to let their private livestock 
graze or bees forage at the fields of the collective farm. Further, the collective farm, as a rule, 
ploughed the household plots and provided free inputs such as manure or fodder for private 
livestock. Most of these entitlements were mutually agreed between farm management and 
employees, although employees and villagers also had one-sided claims on collective 
property, which were considered stealing by the farm management. The land reform and 
reorganisation of the farm enterprises in the 1990s did not take into account these existing 
property relations. 
                                                          
14 The mayor did not agree with starting a new investment site further away from the village, and as a result the 
investor continued to search elsewhere. The investor could understand the position of the local authorities and 
mentioned their care for the rural inhabitants with some appreciation. The word ‘mayor’ is used here following 
the terminology of the interviewee. 
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Research on property in other countries has shown that informal property rights are often 
overlooked during property reform, and it is not easy to do justice to the complex web of pre-
existing property rights when formalizing them (von Benda Beckmann 2003, von Benda 
Beckmann et al. 2006). While many of the farm directors continued part of these 
longstanding, informal entitlements after the land reform of the 1990s (Spoor and Visser 
2004, Visser 2009), with the emergence of outside investors farm property is often fenced off, 
support to households is curtailed and guards are installed (Visser 2008, Nikulin 2010). 
Nikulin (2010) shows in his case study of a large investor in Perm region that while villagers 
quite easily sold their land shares as they did not cultivate the land, they often persistently 
opposed the new production technologies (industrial ploughing and chemical fertilisation) 
brought along by the investor, which disturbed the livelihood they had built on the 
‘abandoned’ land. The investors stated:  
Now we …will increase the ploughing area up to 7 thousand, [...] Meanwhile, many 
people here have formed a certain life style, the life style of living in the forest. They go 
to the woods, they keep bees. When we arrive here with an active production cycle, to 
some extent we disrupt their social rhythm. Now they cannot already wander in the fields 
and ride as they please, because the fields are ours, and they are ploughed by us, […]. 
Instead of their wild strawberries there is, let’s say, our pea. We begin ploughing the 
young forest with which the fields are overgrown, but there are mushrooms there 
(Nikulin 2010, 26).  
Third, even if land is uncultivated usually there is an owner. Although part of the population 
is prepared to sell or rent out their land, not all of them want to do so. Some would be able to 
work the land physically. Some of them sell the land because the institutional environment, 
described earlier, is such that they have difficulty getting finance or registering their land, and 
also sometimes there are regional limitations (minimal limits to the size of farms). 
Fourth, the rural dwellers are often in unequal power relations vis-à-vis the investors and 
rarely get a good price for their land. Here the difficulties mentioned earlier, of registering 
land for rural dwellers, play an important role. Costs of registration hamper them in their 
opportunities to sell the land freely. Often, the costs of registration are prohibitive and 
investors buying the land take up these costs. Even when agroholdings ‘freely’ buy up the 
shares of the employees, as is often the case with LFEs, the management and employees often 
sell under pressure from the investor. In a survey among 200 farm employees who sold off 
their land shares to an agroholding, 156 answered that they did so under pressure of the 
holding group (Gerasin et al. 2003, p.176). 
 
7. Land accumulation strategies 
A major consequence of the share-based privatisation of land was that large farm enterprises 
(LFEs) retained control over former state-owned agricultural land because most land 
shareowners rented their share allotments back to the large farm in return for payment 
(incidentally, villagers rented out their land to private family farms but in many cases there 
was no other actor to rent the land to than the local farm enterprise). As a result, investors in 
search of land normally encounter large farms with integrated landholdings, but with actual 
ownership being very dispersed in the form of land shares. A relatively small amount of 
agricultural land concerns land shares concentrated in the hands of one, or a few, owners. 
Normally these are farm managers or outsiders who managed to obtain shares from the rural 
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population. Finally, as mentioned earlier, a minority of agricultural land is still held by the 
state (often regional authorities or municipalities).  
There are several strategies to acquire land in Russia. Land can be leased, or it can be bought 
in various direct and indirect ways. Buying up (or leasing) land from a large number of land 
shareholders takes quite some time. It was shown earlier that the registration procedure leads 
to high transaction costs. Sometimes investors try to avoid the time-consuming and 
bureaucratic procedures of acquiring land, in order to grab land at a very low cost15. 
Frequently, the strategies of land acquisition within the framework of the law are combined 
with or substituted by means that contradict the national laws or obey the letter of the law but 
not the spirit, using loopholes of Russian legislation to legalise unfair land acquisition16. Thus, 
one could discern a continuum of land acquisition strategies, running from acquisitions within 
the framework of the law, strategies at the fringe of the law (including misinformation, deceit 
and pressure), and finally outright fraud and dispossession. Due to limitations of space, the 
discussion below will cover strategies at the two opposites of the spectrum and largely leave 
aside the in-between category. 
 
     7.1. Land accumulation strategies within the framework of the legal system  
The first way of obtaining land is leasing or buying land from (dispersed) land shareholders. 
Lease was already possible before the 2002 land law on land transactions. Buying and selling 
of agricultural land by individuals is minor compared to leasing land shares from shareowners 
(or the state). According to the research of Lerman and Shagaida (2007) in corporate and 
peasant farms, the share of leased land is on average 60 percent of the total area of 
agricultural land used. In corporate farms, three-quarters of the leased land is in the form of 
land shares and only one-quarter is leased as land plots.  
Currently, much of the land acquired by agroholdings is rented, but there seems to be a 
growing tendency to buy land, which is of course partly due to the law of 2002. Based on our 
web research and interviews, we can conclude, not surprisingly, that foreign investors prefer 
buying to leasing. In our interview with Gustav Wetterling of Agro-Invest Group, he said: 
We have significant costs related to getting rid of all the weeds, all the trees… So that’s 
why we want ownership. So we know that we have it for a long period, so we will get 
this money paid back. There is a significant investment in the beginning… (Interview 
23 September 2010, Moscow). 
Many agroholdings do not disclose information about land in use and ownership, but the 
official web pages of the main ones which do so suggest that the abovementioned statement 
by the representative of Black Earth Farming is indicative of a wider trend. 
This company buys land rights directly from every individual shareholder, making an 
agreement with rural dwellers to register the land unit in their name and on their behalf and 
then buying this land according to a sale-purchase agreement. When Black Earth Farming 
                                                          
15 It should be noted that these strategies are mainly used by domestic agroholdings or ones that are offshore 
investment funds of Russian oligarchs. 
16 Also some deals which are within the framework of the law, such as a deal involving a farm director selling 
his land shares to an outsider, may have been preceded by a fraud in obtaining these shares from the rural 
population but with the legal period for filing a complaint on the early fraud expired. 
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began land acquisitions in 2004, it paid 90 Euros per ha (Kandell 2009). According to the 
director, the shareholders were happy to sell their rights as they were not able to register the 
lands themselves due to bureaucratic obstacles and the costs of registration, which can be too 
high for poor villagers; hence, their land did not provide them with any income. Gustav 
Wetterling stated that ‘during the last two years we got one offer per week to buy a land plot. 
There is no shortage of land for sale in Russia right now’ (Interview 23 September 2010, 
Moscow). 
The same mechanism was used by Agro-Invest Brinky BV. The CEO of this Dutch company, 
Willeke van den Brink, stated that it was difficult to acquire the shares of former collective 
employees. ‘It was problematic not only to agree on the (conditions of the) sale, but even to 
find all these people: someone died, someone had left, et cetera’ (Luchev 2009). Acquiring 
shares for a controlling stake in the hands of Agro-Invest Brinky took close to one year. 
Dealing with large numbers of shareholders is a common downside for investors building up 
an agroholding in this way. The UK company Heartland Farms Ltd, owner of 18,500 ha in 
2009, concluded contracts with around 1500 land owners (BTA Analitika 2008, p.15).  
A way to obtain large amounts of land in one go without numerous negotiations with 
individual land shareholders is, first, to buy a whole farm enterprise (in which land shares 
were already accumulated by the farm management). Buying land in this way is in some cases 
not done completely legally (see next sub-section). The villagershareholders do not always 
want to invest their shares in the companies. Investors used tricks, and some started preparing 
the documents of the enterprise and placing their managers in the farm staff several years 
before they announced their wish to acquire the farm17. 
Second, a minor, but increasing, percentage of land has been accumulated by companies and 
is offered for purchase. For instance, Gazprom, which ended up with half a million ha of land, 
is selling off much of this land. Also some agroholdings which grew rapidly sell off some of 
their land due to financial problems or to cluster their land in a few regions. In these two 
variants, a (foreign) investor faces fewer transaction costs in obtaining land, but of course it 
has to deal with all the other organisational issues of starting up a new farm enterprise, which 
can be quite a laborious process in Russia.  
With the emergence of increasing numbers of domestic agroholdings in the past few years, 
there are foreign and domestic investors that have taken equity (whether a minority or 
majority share) in these entities. Several large domestic agroholdings in Russia and Ukraine 
are even quoted at stock exchanges in Western Europe and others recently have announced 
plans to do so. Also some Western agribusinesses operating in Ukraine and Russia are quoted 
on stock exchanges, such as the French farming group AgroGeneration. Although this process 
of share emissions only started after the mid-2000s, currently Russia and Ukraine already 
have more agroholdings at the stock exchange than do the large agricultural powers of Latin 
America, Brazil and Argentina (World Bank 2010a). In this sense, Russia, which was still a 
socialist country dominated by state and collective farms two decades ago, is now at the 
‘forefront’ of financialisation and large-scale global commodification of agriculture and land. 
An expert with Renaissance Capital stated that Russian agriculture will increasingly be 
                                                          
17 Based on interview with Tamara Semenova, vice-president of the peasant movement Krestyanskiy Front, 
discussing the case of the farm enterprise Matveyevskoye. Interview was conducted 29 September 2010 in 
Moscow, Russia. 
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dominated by agricompanies with capitalisation of over half a billion dollars (Vasilyeva 2008, 
p.2). 
In February 2011, US-based PepsiCo, the second largest beverage and food company in the 
world, obtained a majority share in OJSC Wimm-Bill-Dann, the largest dairy agroholding in 
Russia. Wimm-Bill-Dann owns 37 food factories, many dairies around Moscow and 
elsewhere in Russia and even in other countries of the former Soviet Union, as well as port 
infrastructure. It also controls 40 large farm enterprises, with 20,000 ha in ownership and 
250,000 ha in leasehold. The legal obstacle concerning foreign land ownership has been 
solved by transferring the land bank formally to the owners-founders, who had the controlling 
share before PepsiCo came in. One of the largest agroholdings in Russia, Cherkizovo Group 
OJSC, which holds numerous pig farms and fodder producing farms, is now predominantly 
owned by US investors, namely JP Morgan Chase Bank and MB Capital Partners. Also in the 
Far East of Russia, agroholdings are taken over by foreign investors (Visser and Spoor 
2011b). 
 
     7.2. Land accumulation outside the legal system  
There is increasing evidence of illegal land deals in Russia, in a land market which is 
generally far from transparent. According to official statistics, the number of land disputes in 
the first half of 2008 compared to the first half of 2007 increased by 63 percent for the whole 
system of arbitration courts of the Russian Federation18. An analysis of crimes associated with 
illegal registration of land transactions also indicates growing abuses associated with the 
misappropriation and illegal registration of land transactions (Moskalkova 2011). The ‘leader’ 
in terms of criminal investigations is the Moscow region, due to its advantageous location 
close to the capital and due to the high land prices, which reach 1000–1500 USD per square 
metre as a consequence of demand for land to build dachas19 (fieldwork of Spoor and Visser 
29/10/2011). In 2011, the Governor of Moscow region said that ‘almost of all of them [the 
investors who buy large plots of land] have problems with documents about the land rights’ 
(Moskalkova 2011). Tamara Semenova (Krestyanskiy Front) stated:  
[S]ince the moment that, in 2002, the state law about the turnover of agricultural lands 
came into effect and land became a commodity, illegal court practices have become 
popular in the Moscow region. Before 2002 the land rights were given to peasants, after 
2002 – the other way around’ (Interview, 29 September 2010, Moscow). 
In almost every district of Moscow region, there are land conflicts between peasants and the 
new owners of the land, according to the Krestyanskiy Front. Moreover, the illegal land deals 
do not only happen in the Moscow region, but also in the wellendowed regions of south 
Russia (for instance Krasnodar) and in various other regions (Visser and Mamonova 2011), 
where land acquisitions focus less on conversion into construction sites than in Moscow 
region. However, due to the fact that these regions are covered less by the mass media, the 
situation there is less well known.  
                                                          
18 Report of Arbitration Court of Bashkortostan Republic 2008. 
19 Dacha is a Russian word for seasonal or year-round second homes often located in the exurbs of the country. It 
is estimated that about 50 percent of Russian families living in large cities have dachas. 
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According to Tamara Semenova, ‘invaders’ usually pretend to be investors, offering to invest 
in the development of agricultural enterprises by buying shares. If the peasants refuse to sell 
their shares to these investors, then various illegal schemes are used to achieve the goal. 
Manipulations with land units through forgery of farm enterprise documents on land 
ownership is the most common illegal method of weaning the land from the peasants, because 
technically and time-wise it is most simple to realize. For example, employees of former state 
farm Zaoksky in the Serpukhov district of Moscow region have lost their land as a result of 
the enterprise bankruptcy. As a result of bankruptcy proceedings, more than six thousand ha 
of land were purchased for only 10.8 million roubles (approximately 270,000 euros) by 
Center-Capital CJSC. As a result, over two thousand people lost their legal right to the land 
shares. 
Another criminal case has happened with CJSC Matveyevskoye in the Odintsovo district. 
This case can illustrate an important mechanism through which land grabbers acquire land. 
First there was the falsification of a meeting of shareholders, at which they ostensibly gave 
their shares to the capital of the enterprise. This already took place in the 1990s. There was 
also a case between the two main shareholders of the farm. Supposedly, they were going to 
share their land shares. This court case was specially fabricated to get control over the land 
shares. During this court case, Matveyevskoye acted as a third party. Matveyevskoye came 
with a counterclaim to recognize the rights to the entire land mass for Matveyevskoye. 
Finally, the court recognized the property rights of Matveyevskoye on the land shares of a 
common area of 712.4 ha of land of agricultural value (land value of more than 600 million 
roubles – approximately 15 million euros). Shareholders came to know about this court case, 
which was carried out in another region, only three years later when the statute of limitations 
had passed. In that period the former CEO of Matveyevskoye N. Dubrovsky and the next 
CEO V. Bobynin were assassinated, murder cases that remained unresolved. 
For six years, the shareholders of Matveyevskoye have been seeking the recovery of their land 
shares. However, the prosecutors and investigative bodies, one after another, refused to 
initiate criminal proceedings. Currently, Matveyevskoye is owned by a company registered in 
Britain, Millhouse Capital UK Ltd, which manages the capital of the famous oligarch Roman 
Abramovich and the company Inteko (headed by Elena Baturina – wife of Moscow ex-Mayor 
Yuri Luzhkov). There seem to be no real plans to develop agriculture as had been promised. 
The lands are used to build VIP country houses and business centres. On 1 November 2008, 
appealing to the article 159 Part 4 of the Criminal Code (‘fraud, committed by a group of 
persons on a large scale’) the criminal case No. 152983 was initiated against the ‘raiders’ of 
Matveyevskoye. However, a few months later the case was dismissed at the request of the 
Moscow region Prosecutor’s Office. Currently the victims are appealing to higher authorities 
for help. 
 
     7.3. Countering illegal land acquisitions 
In a few cases, mobilisation by dispossessed rural dwellers who also pursued court cases 
resulted in some effect, but only after very long legal procedures (often involving multiple 
court cases at different levels). Former employees of a poultry farm in Krasnogorsk, Moscow 
region, were in a similar situation to Matveyevskoye above. The farm was acquired after the 
bankruptcy of the Agricultural Land Corporation Znak, co-owned by oligarch Nikolai 
Tsvetkov. Since 2001, people have been trying to restore their rights, but had not succeeded. 
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However, in the middle of March 2010, the equity holders were paid 190 thousand roubles – 
approximately 4,750 euros – (per share of 0.39 ha), to make them withdraw their complaints. 
The following successful case gives more insight into the enormous efforts and kind of 
strategies that are required by rural dwellers to achieve some form of justice.  
‘It is impossible to fight land grabbing with classical legal instruments alone’, says Tamara 
Semenova of Krestyanskiy Front (Interview, 29 September 2010, Moscow). According to her, 
the courts in Russia, especially those that deal with land issues, are bought by raiders. The 
rural social movement, which was founded by dispossessed shareholders of a Moscow farm, 
is the most active among the recently emerging rural movements in Russia (Visser 2010, 
Visser and Mamonova 2011). It started by organizing public events (pickets) in Moscow city 
in order to draw the attention of federal authorities to this issue. It did not work particularly 
well. The state did not respond to their repeated appeals to address the large-scale 
dispossession of land held by rural dwellers. Recently the movement has developed another 
strategy. The movement decided to seek a solution on a case-by-case basis, trying to mobilize 
those rural dwellers directly involved and targeting the companies and authorities related to 
each case. Tamara herself was a leader of the movement of shareholders (600 people) of 
CJSC Agrocomplex Gorky-2 in reaction to an illegal action of acquiring land shares from 
shareholders without any compensation. For two years, the group of deprived shareholders 
has almost never left the Rublyovo-Uspenskoe highway where the management office of 
Agrocomplex Gorki-2 is situated. 
We had been standing for two years three days a week from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. with 
placards along Rublevka20. Well, because it was Rublyovo-Uspenskoe highway, many 
officials and government members use that road every day and they had been asking our 
raiders: ‘When will you pay, when will these protesters leave the road?’ It was the sore 
point that we found. Courts didn’t work for us, of course. In courts we lost every case. 
Totally absurd decisions were made by courts, even sometimes hard to believe: is that a 
circus or a court? (Interview, 29 September 2010, Moscow). 
In total the fight against the Agrocomplex Gorki-2 took five-and-a-half years. According to 
the Krestyanskiy Front leadership they experienced threats and violence and were offered 
bribes in attempts to stop their efforts (Tamara Semenova, Interview, 29 September 2010, 
Moscow). But the activists continued their activities to get compensation. Finally in 2008 the 
shareholders got financial compensation for their lands. 
The previous two cases led to compensation being paid, but restitution of the dispossessed 
land was not achieved. In Moscow, we have found only one court case of illegal land 
acquisition that has led to land being returned to the former, rightful owners. One of the main 
landlords of the Moscow region, JSC Vash Finansoviy Popechitel, has more than 63,000 ha in 
Ruza district in the Moscow region. The Chairman of the Board of Directors Vasily Boyko is 
currently under home confinement. He is charged under the articles of ‘large-scale crime’ and 
‘legalisation of monetary funds or other property acquired as a result of crime’. Vasily Boyko 
used a standard way to assemble the lands: buying up the collective farm land units. He 
acquired nine of eleven farms in Ruza district with a plan to develop a real estate project 
called ‘Ruza Switzerland’. The resort should occupy 40 ha in Ruza district. The project 
included a country hotel with a golf club, equestrian parks and spas, sports facilities and yacht 
                                                          
20 The name ‘Rublevka’ is derived from the name of Rublyovo-Uspenskoe highway. It is an unofficial name of a 
prestigious residential area west of Moscow, Russia. 
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clubs, a ski resort, a mini-airport for sports and business aviation, helicopter pads, a safari 
park and elite cottage villages.  
However, due to the activities of resentful peasants and the end of the support from local 
authorities, the project had to be postponed. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether peasant 
mobilisation in the form of a court case and demonstrations alone could have achieved this 
result. Some authors say that a number of the deprived peasants had private connections with 
bodies of internal affairs and that due to these connections their request was met (Kozyrev and 
Abakumova 2008). Others argue that Boyko lost the support of the local authorities and that is 
why he lost the court case (Solomatina 2007). Meanwhile the CEO of Vash Finansovy 
Popechitel, Maria Loboda, expressed her point of view that the arrest of Boyko is linked to 
the struggle for control over the land in the Ruza district. ‘The purpose of this attack is to take 
away our business by competitors, and law agencies are used as a tool to achieve this goal,’ 
she said in an interview to Rambler Media Group (Rambler 2007). According to Boyko’s 
lawyers, the criminal case was initiated by organisations that are interested in obtaining 
contracts for the construction of the Central Ring Road and have close contacts with the 
government of the Moscow region. In this last version, which might be compatible with the 
earlier explanations, the restitution of land is not a sign of the impartial functioning of the rule 
of law, but rather the result of a power struggle within the arena of the business and political 
elites that offered a rare window of opportunity for the rural dwellers, an example of ‘divided 
elites’, one of the political opportunity structures for social movements as described by 
Tarrow (1998). Therefore, it is important to take a look at the role of the state. 
 
8. The state: policies regarding foreign land investment and land grabbing 
     8.1. Attracting foreign investment 
Agrarian policy of Russia in the Putin/Medvedev era (the 2000s and beyond) has become 
characterized by what has been called ‘economic nationalism’ (Wegren 2009a, b); with more 
focus on food security, increased customs duties (formal, or informal through quality 
controls), and increased use of food policy as a political tool in international relations21. 
Nevertheless, the authorities seem to be convinced that modernisation and production 
increases could be enhanced with foreign investment. As a consequence, over the past few 
years the Russian government is actively encouraging this. 
By Russian law, foreign persons and companies are not allowed to own land. However, the 
legal loophole to avoid this, by establishing a majority or fully owned daughter company in 
Russia, is not at all frowned upon by state officials. In fact, this loophole is actively promoted. 
During a seminar on investing in Russian and Ukrainian agriculture, a Dutch farmer, 
operating in Russia, complained about the fact that a foreigner cannot own land. The Russian 
vice-minister of Agriculture responded that it is no problem, as a foreigner ‘you just open a 
subsidiary in Russia, and buy as much land as you want’22. On the regional and local level the 
                                                          
21 Examples of food policy as a political weapon in Russian international relations have been the wine ban for 
Georgia and the ‘milk war’ with Belarus (Wegren 2009a, b, 2010). 
22 This is based on observations by Visser during a seminar on investment opportunities in the Agribusiness of 
Russia and Ukraine, held in Wassenaar, The Netherlands, November 2010. 
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stance of the authorities differs, depending to a large extent on the governor in charge (Zimin 
2010), but most authorities encourage both domestic and foreign investment in agriculture23. 
 
      8.2. Policies to address illegal land grabbing 
There are some attempts by the Russian federal state to prevent illegal land grabbing, at least 
in discourse. High-ranking Russian officials have recently condemned illegal land grabbing 
and announced measures to prevent it. Former Minister of Agriculture Aleksei Gordeev 
criticized urban ‘raiders’ and warned of ‘wars’ over rural land. As land ‘raiding’ became more 
frequent Gordeev advocated greater government regulation of land relations in order to 
protect the property rights of land shareholders (Wegren 2009b). In 2011, president 
Medvedev condemned land ‘raiders’ in a speech and proposed laws to limit conversion of 
agricultural land into construction land as a main tool to deal with the issue. Overall, there is 
very little indication that the regulations by the state are guided by a concern for the 
dispossession of land held by the rural population. Farmer movements fighting in defense of 
the rural dwellers’ land rights have not been allowed a single meeting with federal 
government officials. In discussions on land governance between officials and academics 
from FSU countries within the framework of meetings on the voluntary guidelines for land 
grabbing by FAO in Moscow (November 2010), of all the officials, Russian officials were 
least inclined to introduce policies to allow free or transparent access to land registration for 
the population24.  
Instead, current policies (and proposed new regulations) are largely oriented at keeping intact 
(and furthering) the concentration of land and the dominance of agroholdings, with more 
power for government land governance bodies (see also Wegren 2009a, b). In 2010 the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade began working on amendments to the Land 
Code, although there is no indication as to when these might be considered by the Duma. 
Draft legislation suggested by the Ministry of Agriculture will: (1) give right of first refusal to 
large farms to lease reregistered land; (2) give preference to municipal and regional 
governments to convert unclaimed, unwanted, and abandoned land to state property; (3) 
increase fines and/or land taxes for land that is used inappropriately or is not used for its 
intended purpose; (4) create a unified system of state monitoring of agricultural land.  
At the moment, two main ways of controlling the land market are implemented. First, 
conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural is becoming more regulated. As Anton 
Mitrofanov, director of the real estate agency Housing Strategy, stated, ‘it was relatively easy, 
in negotiation with the municipality and with limited expenses, to convert agricultural land 
into another category, for instance for the construction of dacha (summer house) complexes’ 
(BFM 2011, p.3). Beginning in 2011 it became more complicated as Federal Law (2010) N 
435-FZ ‘On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation with regard to 
improvement of agricultural lands’ entered into force, which contained additional 
requirements to a transaction of the land is converted from agricultural to construction 
purposes, making such a conversion more difficult. In the Moscow region, where illegal land 
deals are particularly widespread, to prevent widespread conversion of land for agricultural 
                                                          
23 For instance, Visser had various conversations with Dutch businessmen who told him that they were offered 
agricultural land to start a farm by various regional authorities, on visits for business in other sectors. 
24 Observations by Visser at the FAO Voluntary Guidelines regional consultation for the CIS in Moscow. 
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purposes to construction purposes the Federal Law No. 172-FZ ‘On the transfer of land or 
land plots from one category to another’ (2004) has been further elaborated. In the near future 
there will be annual quotas on the sale of land to prevent the sale of agricultural enterprises (to 
agroholdings). However, there is a danger that such measures will only add to further 
bureaucracy and corruption, without substantially reducing illegal conversions.  
Second, regulations combating ineffective use of agricultural land have been introduced, and 
are more often enforced. Authorities can penalize owners for ‘ineffective use’ of agricultural 
land by penalties and even dispossession by the state of agricultural land that is not used for at 
least three years25. In 2009, several regions started to enforce the first part of this law. In 
Leningrad region, the authorities checked 170,000 ha, of which 10,500 ha were not properly 
used, thus total penalties for these land plots amounted to over half a million roubles (40 
roubles was about one euro) (BFM 2011, p.2). Unfortunately, this enforcement can also be 
used to the detriment of land right holders who do not have the funds to ‘properly use’ their 
allocated land, and could therefore be dispossessed by law.  
An important question therefore arises: namely, to what extent will these new laws and state 
policies of closer monitoring of land use (and penalizing or even dispossessing land in case of 
misuse) lead to constraints on illegal land acquisitions? Or will they facilitate dispossession 
and further land grabbing? First of all, the attempt to address the downside of land grabbing 
through handing more power to the state encounters the problem that the local authorities are 
strongly in favour of large-scale land acquisitions and are often part and parcel of the 
problem. It seems that land acquisitions are not possible without ‘friendship’ with, or at least 
ignorance by, the government. According to Tamara Semenova (Krestyanskiy Front):  
[W]hen the raiders came and started buying land, they came not just off the street. It was 
by prior arrangement with the regional and district authorities. Who would let the 
strangers do this business in the Moscow region!? Well, we suppose they got the 
possibility to do this business for ‘otkati’26 (Interview 29 September 2010, Moscow). 
If authorities were willing to address the problem, what are their chances of succeeding? As 
mentioned earlier, authorities have conducted legal procedures to withdraw land that is not 
used for over three years from its owners. However, in practice it is not easy for authorities to 
succeed. In interviews with authorities in Moscow region, it was stated that it is very difficult 
for the state to win such cases, and the interviewees did not know of any example in the 
region where land was actually taken by the state. Sources from elsewhere in Russia confirm 
these statements (BFM 2011, p.2). Due to breaches of the legal procedures, the state loses 
these disputes (BFM 2011) in court cases with rich investors employing highly skilled 
lawyers.  
Moreover, owners of agricultural land with speculative aims go to great lengths to circumvent 
above-mentioned laws. Some landowners are even building (partly) virtual agroholdings to 
accumulate low-priced agricultural land for other purposes27. Vasily Boyko of JSC Vash 
                                                          
25 According to article 284 of the Federal Law N 136-FZ ‘Land Code; see: www.souzsad.ru/index.php/gl/39-
sgt/60-2011-01-26-19-51-51 of Russian Federation’ (2001). 
26 Otkati (in English, kickbacks) – a kind of bribe (money or gift) to authorities. 
27 For more on the Soviet and post-Soviet mechanisms leading to ‘virtual production’ see Visser and Kalb (2010) 
and Kalb and Visser (forthcoming), and see Lindner (2008, 133–139) for a discussion of virtual accounting 
within agriculture. 
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Finansoviy Popechitel has created the ‘agricultural’ holding Ruzskoe Moloko (Milk from 
Ruza), which sells packaged milk. However, the pastures are empty as livestock is sorely 
lacking. It appears that the company buys milk from farmers in neighbouring areas, which it 
(re)packages to sell under its own brand. Another example is oligarch Nikolai Tsvetkov’s 
agricultural company Znak, which pretends to be a poultry farming agroholding. The bulk of 
the eggs the company ‘produces’ it actually buys from a poultry farm in another region and 
subsequently resells under its own brand.  
Thus the law enabling confiscation of ineffectively used land so far does not pose a major 
obstacle for rich land owners, who can hire expensive lawyers and devise creative business 
strategies to prevent dispossession. At the same time, the law may form a threat for the rural 
population with their small land shares’ land plots. Small-scale landowners who are 
temporarily unable to cultivate their land may easily lose their land as they are not able to hire 
lawyers to dispute confiscation of their land by the state. The situation of a school director in 
a village in Moscow region gives an indication of the uncertainty among the rural population 
due to this law. The director was close to his pension, but had no time to work the land 
currently. He was afraid that the state would take this land, and therefore he considered hiring 
someone to plough the land, to prove that he was cultivating the land28. Proposals in the 
Russian parliament (which to date have not been accepted) to have the state confiscate all land 
shares not yet registered (Wegren 2009a, 2011) would primarily lead to dispossession of rural 
dwellers, instead of limiting dubious land acquisitions by outsiders. 
 
9. Conclusions 
This research paper has analysed the post-Soviet land reform, the emergence of domestic and 
foreign investors, their types and the forms of land acquisitions, and the role of the state in the 
emerging land grabs. Russia (and the former Soviet Union in general) is largely overlooked in 
the land grab debate, although the process of land grabbing is occurring there at a great pace. 
Russia is a special case in the global land grab debate. It has vast amounts of land reserves 
and therefore is attractive to domestic and foreign investors. Russian companies, in particular 
in the energy and mineral resources sector, are very active in land acquisitions. Interestingly 
enough, these land deals are not for biofuels production as is the case in other parts of the 
world, since Russia is blessed with ample energy resources and low domestic energy prices as 
a consequence. Land has a speculative value and is meant for food production, urbanisation 
(construction land) and building dachas (‘dachatisation’). 
Russia does not fit in the mainstream division of ‘land grabbing countries’ (oil-rich, and 
highly populated) versus ‘target countries’ (poor and land abundant). Russia is both an oil-
rich country and at the same time one of the most land abundant countries. Also, the case of 
Russia confirms recent critiques of the idea that land grabbing is predominantly carried out by 
foreigners. In addition, Russia does not conformably fit into the two main drivers of land 
grabs distinguished so far: food security (by governments) or commercial motives (by 
companies). In fact, in Russia the government plays an important role in stimulating large-
scale investments (despite some occasional rhetoric to the contrary), but not only with the 
(primary) aim of food security (at least not in the crop sector), but also with the aim of using 
                                                          
28 Interview with school director, Moscow region, 14 February 2011. 
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food export as a political tool in international relations (cf. Visser and Spoor 2011a, Wegren 
2009a, b). 
Although high levels of corruption and government intervention are a major drawback of 
Russia in terms of risk for investors, there are also a range of features of Russia that are likely 
to further raise the interest of domestic and foreign investors in large-scale land acquisitions. 
The huge size of landholdings and farm enterprises, and related infrastructure, is attractive for 
investors. Increasingly, land is available not only as large-scale land plots jointly owned in the 
form of hundreds of individual land shares, but also as ownership concentrated in the hands of 
farm directors, agroholdings or land brokers, although often not in accordance with Russian 
legislation. Also, foreign investors can take equity in large agroholdings registered on the 
stock exchange (Visser and Spoor 2011b). Despite the very recent emergence of Russia as an 
agricultural producer and major grain exporter, together with Ukraine, it already has more 
agricultural enterprises listed at stock exchanges than the established agricultural 
powerhouses Brazil and Argentina together. An increasingly high degree of ‘financialisation’ 
of the agribusiness sector in Russian is observed, which furthermore facilitates large-scale 
land acquisitions or land grabs by global investors.  
The important question is whether this investment will be for the better or worse. On the 
positive side, the agricultural sector might receive an additional boost when investors 
introduce new technology to Russian farm enterprises. Foreign agricultural companies might 
set up new business standards in the agriculture sector in Russia. Gustav Wetterling of Agro-
Invest Group said that he ‘doesn’t think that it would be possible without foreign investments, 
without foreign companies that operate on Russian agricultural market, to achieve these 
results in agribusiness’ (Interview, 23 September 2010, Moscow). Although a foreign 
company like this one, controlling 330,000 ha, has an important impact at a district or 
regional level, on a countrywide scale the predominance of foreign investors is restricted to 
some sub-sectors, such as poultry.  
On the negative side, with growing numbers of domestic and foreign investors interested in 
agriculture, land dispossession and conflicts over land have risen as many (predominantly 
domestic) investors turned to illegal ways of acquiring land. While in Russia the 1990s 
represented the decade of struggle over property in industry and energy, in the first decade of 
the new millennium (2000–2010) attention for agriculture gradually increased, and the second 
decade (2010–2020) increasingly looks like the decade of struggle over land. Indeed, as 
Barnes (2006) pointed out in the quotation at the Section 4 of this paper, in the 1990s the 
property changes in agriculture still seemed underwhelming. Few investors from outside 
agribusiness (mainly domestic processors and among the foreign investors, former food 
importers to the SU) acquired land at that time. However, our research suggests that in quite a 
number of the illegal land grabs, farm directors, sometimes in cooperation with outsiders, 
already in the late 1990s and early 2000s paved the way for the land grabbing that became 
possible after the 2002 land code. In various cases, already in the 1990s meetings of 
shareholders and other documents were falsified to transfer land shares of the shareholders 
illegally to the charter capital of the farm enterprise (de facto to the farm director)29. Farm 
managers who forged documents in the 1990s cashed in on these early moves in the 2000s 
                                                          
29 Whereas in Moscow region farm directors often did so with the perspective of selling it on to outsiders, in 
most other regions in the 1990s rising land prices were not (yet) anticipated and control over the LFE seemed to 
be the main motivation. 
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when they could sell the land for huge profits, while rural dwellers were left landless without 
compensation. In summary, there is a wide range of strategies that are being used by investors 
and oligarchs to get land, from within the existing Russian legislative framework, to outright 
use of pressure, violence and fraud. 
It is likely that land acquisitions will proceed at a great pace in Russia. There is little 
indication that the latest laws and the increased enforcement of laws limiting land conversion 
and ‘ineffective use’ of land will seriously contribute to constraining semi-legal and illegal 
land acquisitions. In fact, they might even contribute to the reverse – namely, increased 
dispossession of land of rural dwellers, as in the discussion on legalisation by Peluso and 
Lund (2011, p.674–675). They argue that rule of law often legalizes and legitimates the 
dispossession of the powerless. Governments and large corporations frequently ‘operate with 
virtual impunity, while weaker actor may see rights whittled away’ in the name of 
formalisation (Peluso and Lund 2011, p.675). In the Russian case there is an urgent need for 
improvement of the impartiality of courts, and the improvement of governance by authorities 
(in particular the transparency of deals between authorities and large-scale agroholdings). 
Without these measures and without stronger rural social movements defending the rights of 
the rural population, regulations and laws most likely will not reduce the risk of further land 
grabbing and dispossession. 
The post-Soviet land reforms actually set the stage for the land grabbing that is taking place 
now, at least de facto, in the way they were implemented. Land basically remained under 
control of the large farms during the reform period of the 1990s, despite the rhetoric of equal 
distribution of land shares. Also, part of the farm management together with the help of 
outsiders already changed legal documents to allow for quick accumulation of land shares, 
once the land code was introduced. 
After the approval of the land code in 2002, and with the rising profitability of agriculture, the 
large farm enterprises (and the agroholdings) are also acquiring de jure control over land, as 
they increasingly take over land through legal and illegal practices. However, de facto control 
of land by the LFEs should predominantly be understood as effective control vis-à-vis the 
rural population, whereas in relation to the state, their control remains insecure and depends 
on cultivating good ties with authorities. With recently introduced and proposed legislation 
giving the state more power over land, insecurity of land for rural dwellers, but also for LFEs, 
tends to increase. Only the largest agroholdings have such a financial power that the 
powerbalance between them and the state remains in favour of the agroholdings.  
While it is shown that Russia is particular because it has huge land reserves, and therefore 
there would be a case to be made that ‘win-win’ land deals are possible, this availability of 
(unused) land thesis is undermined by the fact that much of the land reserve is available in 
areas that are not attractive for investors, and that where there is fertile land in better endowed 
regions, the very unequal power relations between investors and rural dwellers, and the weak 
legal framework (and enforcement of the law), leads often to unfair deals, dispossession and 
no or low compensation. In that sense Russia should be considered as a ‘normal’ case in the 
global land grab debate. 
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